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ABSTRACT. This article discusses how social movements can influence economic systems. Employing a 
political-cultural approach to markets, it purports that ‘compromise-movements’ can help change 
existing institutions by proposing new ones. This article argues in favor of the role of social movements 
in reforming economic institutions. More precisely, Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) movements 
can help bring SRI concerns into financial institutions. A study of how the French Socially Responsible 
Investment (SRI) movement has been able to change entrenched institutional logics of the French asset 
management sector provides wide-ranging support for these arguments. Empirical findings are drawn 
from a longitudinal case study (1997-2009), based on participative observation, interviews and 
documentary evidence. Implications for research on Social Movements, Institutional Change and Socially 
Responsible Investment are outlined. Lastly, the article provides practitioners with some theoretical 
keys to understand the pros and cons of ‘SRI labels’. 
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“Socially Responsible Investment has been so successful that it has died.” - Social Rating Agency, 
Manager, 2007 
Over the past decades, modern capitalist societies have been said to have undergone a 
legitimacy crisis whereby support for both government and economy has been systematically 
eroded (Habermas, 1976; Barker, 1990; Habermas, 2008). Facing this legitimacy crisis, collective 
mobilizations – from environmental to human rights militants and shareholder activism – have 
endeavored to change economic and political institutions. The recent 2008 economic crisis and 
the collapse of some of the most powerful global financial institutions have escalated this 
demand for social change from protest movements to states. Thus, the Economic Nobel Prize 
winner, Paul Krugman, declared: ‘The people who assured us that markets work; that the 
private pursuit of profit always leads to a good result have been rather massively wrong.’ 
(Reuter News, 14/10/2008). These recent developments have contributed to transforming the 
‘movement society’ (Meyer and Tarrow, 1998) from an abstract concept to a concrete and real 
trigger for change. As social movements describe how groups of actors form coalitions to 
create or resist institutional arrangements (Zald and McCarthy, 1977), their project according 
to Habermas must not be understood as a utopian and revolutionary alternative to liberal 
market societies (Habermas, 1996, 1998).  
     The new social movements which have developed over the past decades are collective and 
rational responses to the legitimacy crisis of post-industrial societies (Canel, 1997). Far from 
rejecting economic rationality, these new social movements are expected to play a prominent 
role in reforming the current economic and political institutions, which critically need change to 
maintain democracy (Habermas, 2008). With this in mind, the central question addressed in this 
article is the following: to what extent and under what conditions can these new social movements 
change economic institutions? Drawing on a political-cultural approach to the markets – ‘Markets 
as Politics’ (Fligstein, 1996) – this article posits that economic institutions are social 
constructions whose form and maintenance follow a political project. In this sense, changing 
economic institutions cannot be separated from changing political institutions (Habermas, 1996, 
1998, 2008). 
The new social movement theory initially developed in Europe to explain the emergence of 
new social movements in the 1960s which did not seem to fit a model of Marxian class conflict 
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(Touraine, 1969; Habermas, 1976). These referred to various social movements such as 
regional movements (e.g. the Basque country), Gay Movements and the Women’s Liberation 
Movement. Over the past years, a new generation of social movements has appeared. This 
includes movements such as recycling militants (Lounsbury et al., 2003), shareholder activism 
(Davis and Thompson, 1994) and civil society organizations (Sjostrom, 2007). Notably, these 
movements differ from previous social movements by their focus on economic institutions, 
from which they originate (e.g. shareholder activism). These new social movements strive to 
restore social responsibility within economic institutions: they are known as Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR) movements (Gendron and Turcotte, 2007; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007). 
CSR movements group the four characteristics of the new social movements, namely: a 
collective identity, the sharing of individual resources for a common purpose, a will to change 
existing institutions and the search for a new general orientation for society (Touraine, 1969; 
Zald and Berger, 1978). The Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) movement, which aims at 
bringing social responsibility to the asset management sector, is one of them (Gendron and 
Turcotte, 2007). While CSR movements aim to transform economic institutions, the SRI 
movement focuses on financial institutions. 
Although historically the SRI movement appeared as a marginalized movement composed of 
ethical activists, it has achieved in the last few years a rise in influence and credibility. The 
launch in 2005 by the former United Nations Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, of the Principles 
for Responsible Investment (PRI) illustrates this trend: ‘By acting collectively on the basis of 
these principles for responsible investment, we can help protect all the world’s precious 
assets.’1 (Kofi Annan, 2005) The goal of the SRI movement is twofold: firstly, it aims at changing 
the institutions of the asset management sector by restoring social responsibility in finance. 
Institutions are the collective rules and beliefs which organize a field (Friedland and Alford, 
1991). Secondly, it seeks to propose alternative institutions based on SRI logics.  
Despite the global spread of the SRI movement, research has indicated that the SRI 
movement has differed extensively both in practice and in principle in different countries 
(Louche and Lydenberg, 2006; Bengtsson, 2008; Sakuma and Louche, 2008; Sandberg et al., 
2009). Contrary to financial markets, the SRI movement seems to exist not as a global 
phenomenon but as a sum of separate national movements. According to this analysis, the 
potential impacts of the SRI movement on the asset management sector should be examined 
 4 
 
through a national lens. In this article, the French SRI movement is analyzed. Two reasons 
motivate this choice. Firstly, the French SRI movement explicitly aims at changing the 
institutions of the asset management sector (Europlace, 2008). Secondly, France appears to be 
one of the most dynamic SRI movements in Europe. Overall, the total SRI French market has 
grown 615% between 2005 and 2007, which is one of the fastest growth rates on the continent 
(Eurosif, 2008). Hence, a finely-detailed study of this movement should yield a better 
understanding of the potential role of the new social movements in reforming economic 
institutions.  
Originally, social movement theorists portrayed social movements as ‘spontaneous, 
unorganized and unstructured phenomena’ (Morris, 1994). They now focus their attention on 
how political struggles shape emerging industries (McAdam and Scott, 2005). The concept of 
‘organizational field’ (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), which originates from institutional theory, 
offers a relevant unit of analysis to study this phenomenon. Firstly, it designates particular 
economic institutions as constituents of the wider economic system. Secondly, it embodies the 
common institutional logics of the field (Friedland and Alford, 1991; Thornton and Ocasio, 
1999; Friedland, 2009). Institutional logics are defined as a ‘set of material practices and 
symbolic constructions – which constitutes its organizing principles and which is available to 
organizations and individuals to elaborate’ (Friedland and Alford, 1991). Consequently, an 
appraisal of how a social movement impacts the institutional logics of a field should indicate 
how social movements can contribute to reforming economic institutions. For this purpose, 
this article uses the concept of ‘field framing’ (Lounsbury et al., 2003). This concept 
encompasses both the notion of organizational field and the processes of framing which refer to 
the construction of meaning by a social movement (Benford and Snow, 2000). In other words, 
the concept of field framing refers to the interactive processes which enable the actors of both 
the social movement and the field – challengers and incumbents – to create, maintain and 
change the institutional logics of a field. In particular, this article explores the impacts of the 
‘field framing’ of the French SRI movement on the institutional logics of the French asset 
management field.  
Empirical findings are drawn from a longitudinal case study (1997-2009) of the French SRI 
movement, based on interviews, participative observation and documentary evidence. The main 
thrust of this study concerns the last few years of the movement. Indeed, by gaining legitimacy 
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and penetrating the mainstream asset management sector, the French SRI movement seems 
now to be at a crossroads: its survival appears to be threatened by its success.  
This article makes three main theoretical contributions to Social Movements, Institutional 
Change and SRI, respectively. Firstly, it demonstrates that social movements can impact 
economic institutions and analyzes the relationships between their success and death. Secondly, 
it suggests that social movements can trigger change among the institutional logics of a field and 
that the stabilization of a social movement around institutional logics can spawn the creation of 
a new field. Thirdly, it argues that SRI ‘compromise-movements’ can participate in restoring 
social responsibility to financial institutions. It also claims that social movement theory could 
facilitate the understanding of the dilemma of CSR movements: being successful and dying or 
staying alive but remaining marginal. Furthermore, it envisions that the national anchorage of 
SRI movements has prevented them from adopting a major role in global financial institutions. 
Lastly, it provides practitioners with theoretical keys to understand the pros and the cons of 
‘SRI labels’. 
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 explores the theoretical 
issues under scrutiny. Section 3 and 4 detail the research setting and methodology. Section 5 
exposes the results of the case study. Section 6 discusses the findings and points to further 
research. 
 
Changing Institutions: The Role of Social Movements 
  
How do social movements change institutions?  
A ‘coordinated collective action form’ (Touraine, 1969; Zald and Berger, 1978) can be identified 
as a new social movement if it satisfies four features: having a collective identity, sharing 
individual resources in the pursuit of a common purpose, aiming to change existing institutions, 
and providing a new orientation for society. In a given organizational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983), institutions provide guidance on how actors should behave in the field (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991). The concept of organizational field has been widely developed by institutional 
theorists. DiMaggio and Powell (1983) defined it as organizations that, in the aggregate, 
constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product 
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consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or 
products. 
Social movements aim at transforming existing institutions. They have been traditionally 
designed to change institutions by opposing them from the outside. To do so, they first de-
institutionalize the existing beliefs, norms, and values embedded in the current form. Then, they 
create new forms which instantiate new beliefs, norms and values (Rao et al., 2000). Hence, 
social movements have been theorized as ‘protest movements’ which rally challengers against 
existing institutions by adopting an ‘outsider’ position. This relates to the traditional view of 
institutions as a punctuated equilibrium disturbed by exogenous jolts. The Civil Rights 
Movements (Andrews, 2001) and the Suffragette Movement (McCammon et al., 2001) are 
examples.  
More recently, social movement theorists have acknowledged that social movements can 
also emerge among the organizational field (Fligstein, 1996, 2001). For example, Rao et al. 
(2003) explored how social movements underlined re-institutionalization in certain professions. 
They demonstrated how the Nouvelle Cuisine movement (re)shaped the institutional logics and 
role identities of French cuisine. In this case, social movements gather ‘insider challengers’ who 
rely on existing institutions and hitherto aim to theorize, articulate and combine new projects 
or practices with prevalent arrangements. Contrary to traditional social movements, these 
movements aim to change existing institutions not by opposing them from the outside but by 
transforming them from the inside. This internal change can rely on a compromise approach or 
a conflicting approach between incumbents and challengers. Lastly, a social movement can 
gather both outsider and insider challengers. Notably, this is the case for the French SRI 
Movement which, while emerging within the asset management field, has implicated challengers 
from outside organizations, such as NGOs and trade unions.  
The key success factors of a social movement 
The impact of a social movement on institutions often hinges on how it forms new 
organizations and shapes collective identities. McAdam et al. (1996) identified three key factors 
mobilized by challengers to succeed, usually known as a resource mobilization perspective: 
1. The mobilizing structures which refer to the organizational forms (formal and 
informal) available to the challengers.  
2. The political opportunity structures (and associated constraints) which provides the 
context to challengers.  
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3. The framing processes defined as the collective processes of interpretation, 
attribution and social construction which mediate opportunity and action. 
According to social movement theorists, challengers must frame the issues they defend in 
order to make them resonate with the ideologies, identities and cultural meanings of potential 
supporters of the movement, namely among the incumbents (Benford and Snow, 2000). The 
concept of frame refers to the work of Goffman who defines it as an ‘interpretative scheme’ – 
which helps actors reduce socio-cultural complexity in order to perceive, interpret and act in a 
socially efficient way (Goffman, 1974). The framing of a social movement relates to its strategic 
creation and manipulation of shared meanings, world interpretations and problems. Therefore, 
framing is a cognitive mechanism which affects how people perceive the interests, identities and 
possibilities for social change (Campbell, 1988). It relies on the mobilizing and political 
opportunity structures available to the challengers.  
 
Explaining Institutional Change in an Organizational Field 
The concept of ‘field framing’ 
The ‘institutional logics’ of a field refer to the ‘organizational principles’ of the field (Friedland 
and Alford, 1991) – which provide guidance on how actors in the field should behave. They 
provide the schemes of meaning through which actors make sense in practice of institutions. The 
‘field framing’ of a social movement relates to the framing used by challengers to transform the 
institutional logics of a field. The concept of field framing is close to the concept of institutional 
logics. Both refer to ideas and belief systems and acknowledge the role they play in imparting 
direction, motivation, sense and coherence (McAdam and Scott, 2005). However, field framing 
differs from institutional logics on two major points:  
− Firstly, it focuses on the challenging ideas and not on the dominant logics. 
− Secondly, field framing concerns the political and active construction of new institutional 
logics by a social movement; it is not interested in the institutional logics themselves.  
In other words, institutional logics emphasize the ‘structures’ – the outcomes of the social 
movement, while field framing highlights the ‘structural holes’ – the processes of the social 






The side effect of the success of a social movement 
Little research has explicitly studied the relationship between the death and the success of a 
social movement (Lounsbury et al., 2003). According to previous studies (Rao et al., 2000; 
Lounsbury et al., 2003; Rao et al., 2003), two outcomes linked to the success of a social 
movement can be identified: firstly, changes in the existing institutional logics and consequently 
in the field; secondly, the creation of alternative institutional logics which add to the previous 
ones. The second outcome can lead to the emergence of a new field (Fligstein, 1996, 2001). 
These outcomes and their impacts on the social movement depend on the goals of the 
movement.  
On the one hand, it appears that the primary goal of a social movement is to alter existing 
institutional logics. Therefore, it can be expected that once the movement has succeeded in 
transforming the dominant logics, it will disappear. For instance, this was the case of the 
Suffragette Movement. When women were given the right to vote, the movement ended. In 
other words, the success of the social movement leads to its death. The social movement is 
seen as a temporary trigger for change in a given organizational field.  
On the other hand, previous research (Lounsbury, 2005) has demonstrated that a social 
movement can also lead – intentionally or not – to the creation of a new field, based on 
‘alternative institutional logics’. In particular, the new CSR social movements appear to be torn 
between two objectives: ‘changing the existing field’ and ‘creating a new field’. For instance, 
French SRI challengers have aimed to both 1) transform the institutional logics of the French 
asset management field (i.e. expanding SRI into conventional funds) and 2) set up a new 
organizational field based on SRI logics (i.e. creating an SRI market based on SRI funds). 
However, when a social movement aims to create a new field in addition to transforming the 
dominant institutional logics, the two purposes inevitably collide. Indeed, by downplaying the 
differences between challengers and incumbents, the success of the first goal, ‘changing the 
existing field’, jeopardizes the success of the second, ‘creating a new field’. Furthermore, when a 
social movement stabilizes around common institutional logics, it may cease to be a movement 
and become a steady organizational field, instead. This dichotomy between transforming an 
existing field and creating a new field raises several questions: how can a social movement 
achieve both goals? Can an organizational field play the same role as a social movement? In 
other words, can a social movement stabilize around steady institutional logics? Notably, this 
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would suggest that a social movement could be permanent. Lastly, are there better strategies 
(i.e. outsiders vs. insiders and conflict vs. compromise) according to each goal? These are 
questions that the following case study will attempt to answer. 
In the next two sections, the article examines how the French SRI social movement has 
mobilized field framing in order to achieve its two goals – changing the institutional logics of the 
asset management field and building a new field based on SRI institutional logics. The discussion 
focuses on the various findings. 
 
Research Setting 
What is Socially Responsible Investment?  
SRI means including non-financial criteria for integrating environmental, social, governmental 
(ESG) concerns into investment processes. ESG criteria relate to the non-financial criteria taken 
into account in SRI funds when investing. These are also known as SRI criteria. SRI dates from 
the American Methodist and Quaker movements that appeared during the 1920s. These 
investors originally refused to invest in companies present in the ‘sin-industries’ (e.g. alcohol, 
tobacco, weapons, pornography and gambling). In Europe, the first SRI funds appeared during 
the 1970s as a reaction against apartheid in South Africa. 
Despite this long historical background, the French SRI social movement only developed in 
France a decade ago. Prior to this, a number of ethical funds did exist, but there was no 
collective movement: certain marginal investors – mainly religious – excluded a few companies 
for ethical reasons. They did not have a collective identity or a common purpose. The French 
SRI movement was formed at the end of the 1990s when a few asset managers deliberately 
decided to bring social responsibility to the asset management sector. To do so, challengers 
developed a ‘best-in-class’ approach to SRI, which consisted of selecting the most socially 
responsible companies, whatever their sector of activity. 
 
Features of the French SRI social movement 
With the exception of Canada (Gendron and Turcotte, 2007), most studies of SRI have not 
used new social movement theory to explore the collective action which has underpinned the 
development of SRI. In France, previous research has argued that SRI was led by marginal 
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institutional entrepreneurs, mainly from asset management companies and social rating 
agencies. According to these studies (Déjean et al., 2004; Déjean, 2005; Boxembaum and Gond, 
2006), the development of SRI in France appeared to be an emerging phenomenon which did 
not follow a collective action. In contrast, this article argues that SRI has developed in France as 
a result of a deliberative and organized social movement which aimed at changing the 
institutional logics of the asset management field. In other words, it suggests that the SRI actors 
described as individual institutional entrepreneurs in previous research belong, in fact, to the 
same social movement. The detailed description of the field framing used by the movement 
since the 1990s provides strong support for this assumption (cf. section 5).  
Several elements can explain the differences between both approaches. Firstly, previous 
research on SRI in France studied the movement before it penetrated the mainstream asset 
management sector. So, it was difficult to identify how challengers began succeeding in changing 
the dominant institutional logics. Secondly, none of these studies benefited from participative 
observation within the French asset management sector. Yet, this in-depth integration provided 
a different access to the underlying organization of SRI challengers from interviews. Lastly, the 
approach to SRI itself differed. Whereas previous studies have analyzed SRI as a prolongation of 
the 1920s ethical funds, this article focuses on SRI only when it shifted from an ethical to a 
social movement approach. In other words, it examines SRI at the point where asset 
management companies decided to diffuse this type of investment within the mainstream asset 
management sector (i.e. since the 1990s). 
Despite these differences, previous research and the findings of this case study indicate that 
the French SRI movement satisfies the four features of the new social movements (Touraine, 
1969; Zald and Berger, 1978): 
− Having a collective identity: SRI challengers feel that they belong to the same 
movement – friendship plays a key role. For instance, Penalva-Icher (2007) 
demonstrated that French SRI challengers stood together in the same community 
and that this solidarity was adopted for the common good: the success of the social 
movement. 
− Sharing individual resources in the pursuit of a common purpose: for the movement 
to succeed, SRI challengers cooperate and share knowledge and financial resources, 
namely through mobilizing structures (Déjean, 2005; Penalva-Icher, 2007). Thus, SRI 
analysts who belong to competing asset management companies exchange ideas and 
share knowledge to collectively improve SRI criteria.  
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− Desiring to change existing institutions: SRI challengers aim at bringing social 
responsibility into the institutional logics of the French asset management sector 
(Europlace, 2008). For instance, SRI analysts aim at cooperating with social rating 
agencies, brokers, trade unions and NGOs to convince mainstream (i.e. 
conventional) asset managers inside their company of the financial interest of SRI.  
− Providing a new general orientation for society: this last feature has been developed 
especially for the new social movements. According to the challengers, the 
integration of SRI criteria should introduce social responsibility to the financial 
markets (Europlace, 2008). Namely, during the recent financial crisis, SRI challengers 
explained in the media that SRI may be one answer to the current economic 
problems (Zouati, 2009). 
 
The French SRI movement gathers both ‘insider’ challengers from the asset management 
sector (e.g. asset management companies, social rating agencies, brokers, and so on) and 
‘outsiders’, such as NGOs and trade unions. Outsiders are actors who do not usually belong to 
the asset management sector. Both types of challengers have participated in the framing of the 
movement, including outsiders who are indirectly linked to the asset management sector and 
who favor the notion of the asset management field over the asset management sector. The 
asset management field is then wider than the asset management sector. The institutional logics 
of incumbents (i.e. mainstream actors) consist of favoring financial performance over other 
criteria, including SRI criteria. The new institutional logics developed by challengers aim at 
adding SRI performance to financial performance. This is obtained through the integration of 
SRI criteria into investment processes. The goal of challengers is twofold: 1) to transform the 
dominant institutional logics by encouraging conventional actors to integrate SRI criteria when 
investing; 2) to create a new field based on SRI logics by developing SRI funds that are different 
from conventional funds. 
 
Research Methods : Data Collection and Sources 
Interviewees and interviews 
Key interviewees were identified after a one-year period of participative observation within the 
French SRI movement (June 2006-June 2007), conducted as an SRI analyst in a French asset 
management company specialized in SRI. Aiming at exploring the phenomenon of the 
penetration of SRI into the mainstream asset management sector, two sets of people were 
interviewed. The first set of interviewees grouped as SRI challengers. They included SRI asset 
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managers, SRI trade associations, trade unions, social rating agencies, SRI consultants and SRI-
oriented NGOs. The second group of interviewees comprised incumbents: actors known as 
mainstream actors who showed a growing interest in SRI. They included asset managers, the 
asset management trade association, financial institutions, brokers, finance-oriented NGO, 
pension funds and consultants. In this fashion, 33 interviews were conducted during the period 
from July 2007 to March 2009. Fifteen interviews were conducted within the challengers group 
and 18 within the incumbents’, in all, five asset management companies, four financial 
institutions, two brokers, two trade unions, three consultants, one trade association, two 
NGOs, one pension fund, one think-tank and five social rating agencies. During the interview 
period, the two groups gradually intertwined. 
Semi-structured interviews lasting between 45 minutes to two hours and 15 minutes were 
conducted face to face for 29 interviews. Telephone interviews from one to two hours with 
four other informants were based on a questionnaire previously sent to the interviewee. 
Twenty-eight interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed word-for-word. For the five 
other interviews, interviewees’ comments were recorded in handwritten notes, which were 
reviewed, edited and transcribed immediately. Further details are provided in Appendix 1.  
All interviewees were asked to (1) explain how they perceived SRI personally, (2) describe 
to what extent and how their activities had been impacted by SRI over the past decade, (3) tell 
how they analyzed the relationships between SRI and the mainstream asset management sector, 
(4) envisage the future of SRI in France. Other questions were tailored to the interviewees’ 
specific roles.  
 
Participative Observation 
According to the typology of membership roles designed by Adler and Adler (1987), the 
researcher adopted the position of an active member. That is, the researcher ‘assumed a 
functional role in addition to the observational role; which facilitated trust and acceptance of 
the researcher, but increased the identification of the researcher with members of the setting’ 
(Adler and Adler, 1987). This participative observation within the SRI movement as an SRI 
analyst continued without interruption from June 2006 to June 2009 and was supported by data 
gathering based on day-to-day field notes. The researcher participated in think-tanks, working 
groups, SRI road shows, conferences and business meeting with consultants, agencies and 
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brokers, representing almost 40 formal events per year. These formal meetings were 
completed by various informal discussions with various field actors and a continuous strategic 
surveillance thanks to the amount of information garnered from the field’s actors – specialized 
newsletters and media coverage. This ongoing participative observation allowed for 
supplementary information to be gathered throughout the interviews with a comprehensive, 
tangible knowledge of SRI during the movement’s turning point. 
 
Documents and Secondary Data 
Extensive data were collected from documentary sources, including trade association surveys, 
professional reports (consultants, asset managers, brokers and social rating agencies), NGO 
studies, newspapers, newsletters, websites, theses, academic papers and books. Market data – 
amount of assets and number of funds, asset managers and SRI analysts – and press coverage 
were based on information on company websites, Novethic, Factiva and the AMF (Autorité des 




To analyze the data, a field analytic method was used (Scott et al., 2000; Lounsbury et al., 2003), 
which consists of tracking changes over time in a field. Notably, this method focuses on the 
critical events, such as organizational births, deaths, mergers and various types of 
transformation, for example, changes in clients’ demands and press coverage. This method has 
been judged particularly relevant for supporting the investigation of long-term change processes 
(Goodrick, 2002). For this purpose, an approach was used which resembled the sequence of 
sense-making strategies (Langley, 1999) that would later be called grounding, organizing and 
replicating (Chiles et al., 2004).  
Grounding strategies refer to theories that are derived from data, systematically gathered and 
analyzed through the research process. A key process in grounded theory is the coding of the 
data. An ‘emerging coding’ system was adopted which means that codes emerged from 
collected data into three successive levels of coding (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). The first level 
refers to open and axial coding and consists of coding and then organizing every incident into 
categories: core variables which referred to broad conceptions. For instance, the code 
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‘Mainstreaming’ was used when actors evoked the integration of SRI criteria into financial 
analysis and the code ‘Ethics’ when actors speak about the ethical approach of SRI. After having 
found the core variables, data was coded with a selective coding (second level). Hence, the 
code ‘Mainstreaming’ was divided into two sub-codes: ‘Financial Valuation’ when the 
mainstreaming approach followed a financial approach and ‘Social Responsibility’ when the 
integration of SRI criteria into the mainstream was triggered by responsibility concerns, such as 
external pressure. In the same way, the code ‘Ethics’ was divided into two sub-codes: 
‘Exclusion’ when companies were excluded according to their sector and ‘Best-in-Class’ when 
the best socially responsible companies were selected in each activity sector, whatever their 
sector. At the same time, new data were sampled with the core in mind. As categories, 
subcategories, and relationships emerged, this data-driven conceptual framework was 
compared with a broad spectrum of academic literature in social sciences. At this point, a 
theoretical coding system (third level) was mobilized, based on social movement theory and the 
concept of field framing. This aimed at conceptualizing how the substantive codes relate to each 
other as hypothesis to be integrated into a theory. For instance, using the code ‘Mobilizing 
Structures’ was used when identifying organizational forms used by challengers to convince the 
incumbents. This first stage of analysis therefore yielded a set of concepts grounded both in 
theory and in data.  
Organizing strategies draw process data in a systematic fashion (Langley, 1999). For this 
purpose, a chronological display (cf. figure 1) is constructed to chart the temporal sequence of 
salient events of the French SRI movement from 1997 to 2009. The event categories and 
specific events were derived from my grounded theory analysis. This qualitative analysis was 
complimented by quantitative data (cf. figures 2 to 4), which tracked changes in the number of 
asset management companies proposing SRI funds (1999-2008), the amounts of assets and 
number of funds in SRI compared to the total market (2000-2008), the number of articles 
mentioning SRI in French newspapers and the number of SRI analysts in asset management 
companies (2000-2008).  
Replicating strategies are techniques for ‘decomposing the data for the replication of 
theoretical propositions by phase, by event, and by case’ (Langley, 1999). For this purpose,  
temporal bracketing was used which allows the tracing of the theorizing process over time. As 
shown in figure 1, the French SRI movement is structured into the following periods:  
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1. The Pioneering Era (1997-1999) which refers to the framing of a collective identity 
by challengers. 
2. The Building Era (2000-2003) which relates to the framing of the challengers’ logics 
on the incumbents’ ones. 
3. The Legitimating Era (2004-2005) which coincides with the penetration of 
challengers into the incumbents’ field. 
4. The Mainstreaming Era (2006 to the present) which fits the adoption of the 
challengers’ logics by incumbents. 
 
Although the field analytic method is widely used in field studies (Scott et al., 2000; 
Lounsbury et al., 2003), it suffers from several limitations. Firstly, it has been difficult to trace in 
detail the full history of the field due to the lack of data. For instance, all the actors who 
participate in the field could not be interviewed. Moreover, the analysis had to focus on certain 
key events, at the expense of other aspects of the field framing. Secondly, this method meant 
relying on secondary data to analyze the first years of the movement. In particular, previous 
research and interviews were used to trace events that took place prior to 2006. This 
prevented experiencing in practice certain assumptions made by other researchers and 
interviewees (even if most of interviewees belonged to the field since the beginning of the 
movement). Lastly, even if in the field for a long period of time, it has been impossible to fully 
access the ‘true’ motivations of actors through interviews. However, the wide-ranging array of 
interviews, observations, documents and secondary data provided rich contextual details, 
enables triangulation between the different sources of information and to accurately account 
for the different stages of the movement since its beginning. In the next section, an historical 
account is provided with evidence highlighting the importance of field framing to the efforts of 
the French SRI social movement to alter established institutional logics and propose new ones 
within the asset management field.  
 
                                 Figure 1 through 5 [Insert FIGURES 1 to 5 here] 
 
Emergence, Development and Future of the French SRI Movement 
1997-1999: The Pioneering Era 
The creation of the first French social rating agency, Arese, in June 1997, set the wheels of SRI 












strategic for both sides: 1) without clients, Arese could not survive; 2) without a social rating 
agency, asset managers could not create SRI funds. This cooperation was also social. Both 
actors aspired to the same goal: bringing social responsibility into the asset management field. 
Through informal networks, challengers exchanged their experiences and their dreams. In this 
way, challengers incrementally built the collective activity of their movement. 
In order to succeed, the SRI social movement wanted to be accepted by the rest of the asset 
management field. Indeed, being field members, challengers needed to frame their movement 
on dominant institutional logics to gain legitimacy. Moreover, strongly criticizing their peers 
would have meant questioning what they had done for years and what they continued to do. 
This construction of legitimacy took the form of the conception of products that conformed to 
the institutional logics of the asset management field (Déjean, 2005). Firstly, social rating was 
built on the financial analysis model: 
 
“When we founded Arese ten years ago, our system was merely qualitative. 
We later designed a system of quantitative scoring that was more convincing 
for our clients.” 
Arese, Former Analyst, 2007  
 
Secondly, the official goals of SRI funds were clearly not ethical. By taking into account SRI 
criteria, SRI asset managers pleaded in support of higher financial returns in the long term. 
However, this assertion remained a belief; the adoption of SRI relied first on personal 
convictions. This necessary acceptance by the asset management field also obeyed technical 
constraints. To be legal, SRI funds had to receive clearance from the AMF. In other words, SRI 
funds were technically akin to conventional funds (e.g. same practices in terms of risk, 
diversification and investment processes).  
Since challengers belonged to the same social movement, they preferred cooperation to 
competition (Penalva-Icher, 2007). This sharing of individual resources also contributed to 
bringing help to people without the support of surrounding networks due to their insurgent 
position. Indeed, in 1999, only 16 companies offered an SRI fund and the total amount of SRI 




2000-2003: The Building Era 
Action undertaken by the French government was a significant inducement to growth. Firstly, 
the government enforced two laws: the NRE Law (2001) which obliged listed companies to 
report on the social and environmental aspects of their activities and the Fabius Law (2001) 
which both permitted and affirmed the importance of employee saving funds. Secondly, in 2000, 
the government created a public pension fund with a dedicated SRI policy: the FRR (Fonds de 
Réserve des Retraites)3. This major cue from one of the France’s major potential investors clearly 
explained to a large extent the entry of mainstream actors on the SRI market. This rise in 
demand was confirmed by the creation in 2001 of the CIES (Comité Intersyndical de l’Épargne 
Salariale)4 which provided a trade union ‘SRI label’ to a range of SRI employee saving funds. 
Drawing on these political opportunities, challengers began to build mobilizing structures to 
support their movement. They aimed at framing their logics on the logics of incumbents (i.e. 
financial logics). In 2000, the ORSE (Observatoire sur la Responsabilité Sociétale des Entreprises)5 was 
founded by approximately fifteen members – most of whom were asset management 
companies. The ORSE rapidly grouped 100 actors, principally among financial institutions and 
listed companies. This association aspired to give endorsement to the idea that CSR yielded 
performance. Firstly, the ORSE helped listed companies to adopt CSR institutional norms. Then, 
it contributed to collectively standardizing SRI criteria and SRI practices, thereby boosting the 
development of SRI. In other words, through its mobilizing structures, the SRI social movement 
endeavored to build a relationship between SRI and financial performance, enabling its self-
fulfilling prophesy (Gond, 2006): 
 
“The SRI market […] effectively auto created. The market created itself.” 
Broker, Head of SRI research, 2007 
 
Meanwhile, two other mobilizing structures were launched: 1) the FIR (Forum pour 
l’Investissement Responsable)6 which aimed at promoting the concept of SRI and its practices; 2) 
the SFAF (Société Française des Analystes Financiers)7. Through these structures, challengers aimed 
at 1) agreeing on the field framing of the movement (the ORSE and the FIR); 2) convincing the 
asset management field of the relevance of SRI, namely by influencing financial analysts (SFAF). In 
2001, the professionalization of the SRI movement was helped by the creation of Novethic; an 
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independent organization financed by the Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, a public financial 
institution. Novethic wanted to build the legitimacy of the SRI movement by providing 
quantitative public data (Giamporcaro-Saunière, 2006). By offering definitions and assessments 
of SRI funds, Novethic gradually revealed the existence of the SRI movement to the media and 
to the asset management field. 
In 2002, Arese became Vigeo and the former CEO of Arese formed CoreRatings. These 
two agencies dominated the French SRI market for over two and a half years. Consequently, 
SRI funds were managed according to the same social ratings. This technical mimesis also 
helped produce common practices. Moreover, these agencies created SRI indexes (e.g. Aspi 
Eurozone, Ethibel Index, DJSI Stoxx and FTSEE4Good) which became reference points for SRI 
asset managers (Déjean, 2005) and contributed to bringing SRI into the heart of stock markets. 
Vigeo had a structural and key impact on the SRI movement. Firstly, by fitting the French 
business model, based on ‘partnerships’ with financial institutions, trade unions and listed 
companies, the agency enabled the recognition of SRI by the French elites (Zarlowski, 2007). 
Secondly, it helped carve out the positive relationship between SRI and financial performance by 
conceiving SRI analysis which aimed at identifying the SRI criteria which would impact financial 
performance:  
 
“You’re not here to save the planet, as they say. You work for investors. So 
you really do need a vision of the economic impacts on firms and how they 
can impact their business.” 
Vigeo, Former Analyst, 2008 
 
To obtain the CIES label, asset management companies had to devote internal resources to 
SRI. The first SRI Analysis Department was created in 2002. Asset management companies 
coined a new term: the buy-side SRI analyst. At the end of 2003, SRI as a niche had been 
developed but remained an emerging inexperienced activity. As stated in the Eurosif’s annual 
report (2003) on the French SRI: ‘For the moment, however, most traditional financial 
institutions are waiting to see how the market unfolds, while other non-financial players decide 
how to go forward.’ The social movement began to be recognized but had not yet succeeded; 
incumbents vacillated. In 2003, the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) was launched to 
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encourage ‘private and public sector organizations to measure manage and reduce emissions 
and climate change impacts.’8 Mainstream investors began to feel the pressure.  
 
2004-2005: The Legitimating Era 
The SRI market grew and appeared to be shifting structurally from an offer market to an 
institutional demand market. In 2004, the ERAFP (Établissement de la Retraite Additionnelle de la 
Fonction Publique)9, the second largest French public pension fund, was created. As did the FRR, 
the ERAFP clearly showed its willingness to invest in SRI: ‘[…] it has been decided to adopt 
socially responsible investments for the totality of ERAFP’s assets.’10 Enthusiasm for SRI also 
existed among private pension funds as illustrated by the decision of AGIRC (Association Générale 
des Institutions de Retraite Complémentaire des Cadres)-ARCCO (Association pour le Régime de 
Retraite Complémentaire des Salariés)11 to invest €100 million in SRI funds in 2005. These 
institutional clients were partly responsible for shifting SRI to financial logics. Firstly, they 
rejected the idea of SRI indexes contributing to their failure among invitations to tender: asset 
managers had to beat the conventional market. Secondly, they favored a ‘best-in-class’ 
approach, which occasionally maintained high financial returns at the expense of SRI. As a result, 
these financial features casted doubt on the sincerity of the SRI movement and clients became 
mistrustful:  
 
“When individual clients buy an SRI product, they face a dilemma. [...] Clients 
are satisfied when the product achieves a good financial performance, but 
then, when they look closer at the first ten lines of the portfolio, they say: 
“You’ve got TOTAL, but that’s just not right!”12 
Asset Management Industry, Head of SRI, 2007 
 
To keep the movement alive, the SRI movement had to highlight its distinguishing 
features. In 2004, to regulate the movement and signal that SRI was of paramount importance 
for the asset management field, the AFG (Association Française de Gestion financière)13 created an 
SRI Commission. In the same vein, both challengers and incumbents (Eurosif, FIR and AFG) 
decided to launch a ‘Transparency Code for Public SRI Funds’ in 2005. This encouraged asset 
managers to describe their investment processes. However, the penetration of mainstream 
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actors into the SRI movement also raised problems; the latter would have acted out of self 
interest: 
 
“We realized that those who believed in SRI were those who dedicated 
internal resources. Otherwise, it was what we called “anisette” offers14, 
meaning 1/7 SRI and 6/7 everything financial!” 
Trade Union, CIES Member, 2007 
 
The penetration of the mainstream asset management field by the SRI movement was 
helped in 2005 by the launch of two international SRI initiatives dedicated to mainstream 
investors: firstly, the EAI (Enhanced Analytics Initiative) which addressed the absence of quality, 
long-term research studying material, non-financial issues; secondly, the PRI (Principles for 
Responsible Investment), which claimed that ‘environmental, social, and corporate governance 
(ESG) issues can affect the performance of investment portfolios.’15 The PRI had a strong impact 
on the success of the movement since the principles demonstrated to mainstream investors 
that SRI existed. As a result, by questioning existing practices, SRI provided financial actors with 
the cultural resources necessary for critical and reflexive action: 
 
“Asset managers began to sign the PRI for their SRI funds, and surprisingly, 
this encouraged them to progressively integrate SRI criteria into the rest of 
their investments as well.” 
Social Rating Agency, Head of SRI Research, 2007 
 
Making the most of this attention, SRI challengers decided to directly penetrate mainstream 
organizations. Coming from social rating agencies, challengers aspired to prove the positive 
relationship between SRI and financial performance: something that had not yet been proven to 
date. To do this, they opened mainstream-oriented SRI Departments within the majority of 
brokers in 2004 and 2005: CM CIC Securities, Société Générale Corporate and Investment 
Banking, Oddo Securities and Cheuvreux, for example. Financial analysts began to be 




  “I can tell you that we have people here who work on these SRI criteria 
when it comes to acquisitions, mergers, or trading…” 
Broker, Head of SRI Research, 2007 
 
At the end of 2005, SRI was no longer a small movement led by activists, since the social 
movement had been recognized by mainstream actors. SRI was about to take up its first 
challenge: transforming the asset management field. However, the asset management field had 
not changed in essence and SRI still represented less than one per cent of total assets. SRI was 
a legitimate but still emerging practice. 
 
2006-2009: The Mainstreaming Era 
While SRI adopted financial logics, mainstream actors took over SRI logics. These two 
movements gradually resulted in a merging of both logics. In 2006, the term ‘SRI Integration’ 
was used as a concrete theory for the first time in Novethic’s annual study of the market 
(2006):  
 
“We have taken into account a new demand which seems to be sustainably 
accepted amongst investors: the transversal integration – case by case – of 
non-financial analysis criteria into classical financial analysis.”  
 
  At the end of 2007, the SRI market, as such, measured a third of the size of the ‘SRI 
Integration’ market in terms of assets. In regard to this integration, the FRR decided in 2008 to 
adopt SRI screening for all its investments. Even Paris Europlace – the organization which 
promoted Paris as a financial market place – affirmed the importance of SRI in a report 
(Europlace, 2008): it was henceforth a matter of business for the sector. Gradually, SRI and 
financial analyses became faces of the same (financial) coin: 
 
  “I think that we’re experiencing a phenomenon of integration. Depending on 
the management, depending on the funds, integration will be more or less 
important.” 




In 2007, SRI Research became a category within the Financial Analysis prizes awarded to 
the profession. Along the same lines, Cheuvreux was the first broker to sign the PRI in 2008. 
The asset management sector officially recognized that non-financial analysis belonged to 
financial analysis. The publication in 2007 of a special SRI issue by the Journal of the SFAF 
confirmed this adoption. Notably, this evolution was illustrated in 2007 by the creation of the 
Swiss ASSET4, a new type of social rating agency which – contrary to previous social rating 
agencies – primarily targeted mainstream investors rather than SRI investors. ASSET4 defined 
itself as the Bloomberg of ‘non-financial’ corporate metrics. To create more value, SRI and 
financial analysis needed to be merged. This adoption of SRI criteria by mainstream investors 
contributed to converting the previous existing social rating agencies into database providers. 
Increasingly, social rating agencies began modeling themselves on financial agencies: 
 
“Personally, I’m under the impression that agencies are tending to become like 
ASSET4. […] I think that they will evolve in the same way as financial 
agencies.” 
Asset Management Company, SRI Analyst, 2008  
 
This integration did not mean that SRI was no longer concerned with social questions. 
On the contrary, it illustrated that financial actors began recognizing the need to take into 
account SRI criteria when investing. The success of SRI was explained to a certain extent by the 
fact that SRI did not sidestep important issues. SRI embodied the undergoing change of 
economic institutions. Global society faced new challenges: climate change, pollution, hydraulic 
stress, poverty, and so on. The financial crisis argued in this sense: financially-driven, short-term 
investments revealed themselves to be dangerous, included for financial performance, only.  
 
“Financial actors begin to admit that there are limits to the economic business 
model they’ve been promoting for years. […] The shortcomings of the 
market have shown the necessity of having better non-financial analysis.” 
Asset Management Company, Head of SRI, 2007 
 
Nevertheless, the mainstreaming of SRI had a side-effect. As SRI criteria became a means 
to achieve better financial performance, SRI criteria shifted away from their first goal: restoring 
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social responsibility in financial markets. Certain challengers feared that this move to the 
mainstream would obliterate the original purpose of the movement: 
 
“I’m a little afraid by the fact that we will separate SRI issues because they’re 
difficult to demonstrate in terms of business. But these are the reasons why I 
wanted to work in SRI.” 
Asset Management Company, SRI Analyst, 2008 
 
Lastly, a number of historic challengers suffered from this mainstreaming. Since they were 
competitors, cooperation between challengers and incumbents led to conflicts. As mainstream 
actors had taken up the slack, small asset management companies and social rating agencies 
were in a peculiar predicament. They did not have the means to face competition in a market 
where size brought credibility. If they were the erstwhile leaders, they were henceforth the 
losers of SRI integration. 
 
The Future: A Coexistence of Two Types of SRI? 
 
Two trends seem to be emerging at present: 1) the continuation of the merger between SRI 
and mainstream logics; 2) the emergence of a new, more committed SRI movement. When 
former challengers transform into incumbents, a new SRI social movement appears.  
 
‘Mainstream SRI’: transforming the Asset Management field 
The term ‘Mainstream SRI’ is increasingly used by financial actors to designate the traditional 
‘best-in-class’ SRI funds which attempt to maximize both SRI and financial performance. Firstly, 
the appearance of the ‘mainstream’ term within the movement confirms that SRI has squared 
with common institutional logics. Secondly, it denotes a move to mainstream asset 
management. The demand for SRI integration keeps rising. No less than 20% of the mainstream 
market is expected to become SRI in ten years (Robecco and Booz, 2008). With this in the 
offing, Mainstream SRI seems to be full of promise for the asset management field. This trend is 
confirmed by the diversification of SRI towards different financial products (e.g. funds of funds 
or hedge funds) and SRI thematic funds (e.g. renewable energies, green technologies, water, and 
so on).  
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A growing number of conventional funds are now integrating SRI criteria to achieve 
better financial performance by anticipating those costs linked to a below-average performance 
in social, environmental and governmental domains. At the end of 2009, 90% of conventional 
funds in France were estimated to integrate at least one SRI criterion, compared to 61% at the 
end of 2008 and 3% at the end of 2007 (Novethic, 2010). The idea is less about upgrading 
socially responsible firms than investing in financially promising industries and SRI criteria are 
increasingly selected according to their impact on business. However, this integration is diverse 
among asset management companies and it remains difficult to know what SRI integration 
means in practice. Consequently, certain observers doubt the impact of the SRI integration on 
investment practices (Novethic, 2010). 
If mainstream funds mobilize SRI criteria and SRI funds increasingly favor a business 
approach, how can we differentiate between the two? Indeed, as SRI penetrates the 
mainstream, the differences between challengers and incumbents gradually fade. This threatens 
the survival of the SRI movement. To stay alive, SRI actors have recently created an ‘SRI label’ 
to separate their institutional logics from financial ones. In September 2009, Novethic launched 
the first French SRI label for SRI public mutual funds: 92 funds among the 250 funds listed by 
the organization have obtained the label so far. The purpose of this label is to provide SRI with 
official institutional logics. However, this stabilization over common institutional logics is likely 
to transform the SRI movement into a new field. As for profit-sharing funds, this recognition 
could trigger interest among individual investors by offering financial advantage from the state. It 
could also help SRI to be identified by the state as a key factor in the financial system. For 
instance, SRI challengers are now working with the French government on a new law which 
would oblige all asset management companies to account for the SRI aspects of their 
investments.16 However, although challengers assert that SRI could be a solution to the financial 
crisis, national states have not as of yet paid attention to the movement as a remedy. 
 
A ‘Committed SRI’: proposing a new SRI 
If pioneers do not win, they can go back to being pioneers. While a number of challengers are 
gradually converted into incumbents, contributing to SRI integration, others aspire to propose a 
new, more committed type of SRI. This means an SRI which favors SRI over financial logics. 
These challengers specialize in particular issues, such as human resources, shareholder activism 
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or developing countries. For the first time, ethical questions seem to penetrate a movement 
which first avoided them to gain legitimacy: 
 
“People were saying that these ethical questions were no longer important. 
[…] But I’ve noticed that this last year, these last two years in fact, ethical 
questions have begun to reemerge.” 
Social Rating Agency, Client Relationship Manager, 2008 
 
By proposing a new type of SRI, these challengers also respond to a new demand among 
institutional investors who wish to 1) trace their SRI risks; 2) shield themselves from scandals, 
such as child labor or pollution; 3) favor long-term, diversified investments. For a number of 
years, observers believed it was impossible for SRI to avoid the following dilemma: remaining 
small but with the risk that no investors will be interested in them, or growing and 
institutionalizing, but with the risk of losing their critical function (Louche, 2004). However, 
contrary to expectations, the achievement of SRI’s first goal could give birth to its second. Now 
that SRI has become legitimate, the social movement moves away from financial logics and a 
new SRI appears. In keeping with this trend, a new category appeared in the classification of SRI 
funds provided by Novethic in 2009: ‘ethical funds’. At the beginning of 2010, there were more 
than 68 funds in this category. For the first time, French asset management companies offer SRI 
funds based on exclusion. Certainly, what the movement is devising now will penetrate 
mainstream tomorrow. However, challengers realize that to be successful, they will have to 
cogently advocate what they propose is relevant… SRI is not dead, SRI has just begun. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Summary of Findings 
PIONEERING: SRI as a social movement had two goals: 1) to change the institutions of the 
asset management field; 2) to build a new SRI field. To be accepted by incumbents, SRI 
challengers framed their institutional logics on financial logics: the most socially responsible 
firms should be the most profitable in the long term. They remained a marginal movement, 
unrecognized by mainstream actors for three years. However, this initial collaboration managed 
to carve out the collective identity of the social movement.  
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BUILDING: the advent of supportive political opportunity structures, through an institutional 
SRI demand by the creation of public pension funds, rendered SRI conspicuous. As a result, 
most mainstream actors offered SRI funds. Seizing this opportunity, SRI challengers built 
mobilizing structures which would help make their claim a reality. These formal organizations 
enabled them to agree on common logics.  
LEGITIMATING: realizing the importance of SRI for the field, the profession aimed at 
regulating the social movement. Its first priority was to bring transparency. At the same time, 
challengers penetrated into mainstream organizations to infuse SRI logics among the 
incumbents. However, the adoption of financial logics by SRI had an unforeseen outcome: it 
undermined the motivations of the movement.  
MAINSTREAMING: in the aftermath of the upheaval of the financial markets, challengers argued 
that SRI would restore a long-term view. SRI integration illustrated this trend. Both institutional 
logics began to merge, which threatened the survival of the social movement. 
FUTURE: as a result of its success, the movement could die out. To ward off its death, the 
movement has just introduced an ‘SRI label’ which aims at differentiating challengers from 
incumbents. Nevertheless, a number of questions are being raised concerning the financial 
approach of SRI favored until now by the movement. By selecting those SRI criteria which 
impact business only, the original aspiration of SRI to restore social responsibility in financial 
markets may disappear. With this mind and to eschew this mainstream approach, other 
challengers are developing a new ‘Committed SRI’. Therefore, by originally refusing an ethical 
approach, SRI challengers would have perhaps gained the authority to ultimately shift from 
financial logics. 
 
The role of social movements in transforming economic institutions 
Although institutional theorists have recently acknowledged that institutional logics may change 
through agency, namely through collective institutional entrepreneurship (Lounsbury et al., 
2003), they have said little about how existing logics are dismantled and new logics are put in 
place. This study recasts social movements as a trigger for change within economic institutions. 
The gradual transformation of the institutions of the French asset management field by the 
French SRI movement has demonstrated this point: SRI social movements can play a prominent 
role in reforming financial institutions. Traditionally, such impacts have been theorized as 
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external jolts; fields go through upheaval because of protest-movements. This external view is 
completed here by an internal focus: compromise-movements change the existing logics 
through the incumbents’ ones. They provide them with the necessary resources to take a 
critical look at their own practices. This compromise approach questions the traditional 
perspective of social movements, usually associated with conflicts and outsiders’ actions.  
In the case of the French SRI movement, it appears that SRI challengers have adopted the 
strategy most likely to succeed. Indeed, on the one hand and contrary to other countries, the 
French SRI movement could not only rely on ethical investors, such as religious organizations. 
Consequently, change needed to be driven by insiders. On the other hand, these insider 
challengers belonged to the French asset management field. As a result, it was difficult for them 
to criticize their institutional logics (i.e. financial logics) to develop new ones (i.e. SRI logics). 
This would explain why they have favored a compromise approach. In other words, it appears 
that the French SRI movement has adapted its field framing to the features of its environment 
to succeed. This strategic approach is conducive to an instrumental view of social movements, 
which differs from a view of social movements as ‘spontaneous, unorganized and unstructured 
phenomena’ (Morris, 1994). Drawing on the case study, four strategic phases which refer to the 
key stages of the field framing of compromise-movements have been identified: 
− PIONEERING: framing of a collective identity by challengers. 
− BUILDING: framing of the challengers’ logics on the incumbents’ logics. 
− LEGITIMATING: challengers – and their logics – penetrate the incumbents’ field. 
− MAINSTREAMING: incumbents adopt the challengers’ logics. 
However, other studies of compromise-movements are needed to generalize these findings on 
a broader basis. For this purpose, the concept of field framing could provide an interesting 
analytical framework.  
These findings argue in favor of national differences between SRI movements. For instance, 
SRI activists in other countries, such as Denmark, have geared towards coercing firms into 
being socially responsible (via the law or by an external pressure, such as the media) 
(Bengtsson, 2008). Although this national anchorage has been a key factor of success of the 
French movement (Zarlowski, 2007) by adapting the field framing to the features of the 
environment, it could also have stunted the role that SRI movements could have played in the 
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global financial crisis. SRI social movements would need to be global or at least to cooperate 
internationally to be able to structurally impact global financial institutions. Notably, further 
research in different countries is required to explore whether and why insiders’ strategies 
based on compromise have been favored over outsiders’ strategies based on conflicts. In 
particular, national comparisons between SRI movements could help understand 1) the national 
impacts on the field framing of SRI, 2) the co-evolutions and differences between the national 
SRI movements and 3) whether SRI movements are global movements.  
 
The economic success of SRI 
The economic success of the French SRI Movement raises questions about its motivations. 
Could SRI challengers have adopted the social movement strategy not to transform the 
institutional logics of the French asset management field, but rather to diffuse a new financial 
product in the field? These criticisms have been directed toward other CSR movements which 
have emerged within economic institutions, such as fair-trade (Gendron and Turcotte, 2007) or 
recycling (Lounsbury, 2005). In the case of the French SRI movement, the initial desire of SRI 
challengers to transform the dominant institutional logics argues in favor of a social movement. 
Indeed, the study clearly demonstrates that the movement did not benefit from a major 
business interest among the field for a number of years. SRI challengers were personally 
committed to SRI succeeding, even though they had no personal and business interest in doing 
so. Moreover, until recently, very few incumbents believed in the success of SRI. Lastly, the 
movement constantly gathered the four features of the new social movements (Touraine, 1969; 
Zald and Berger, 1978). Hence, the economic success of a social movement does not seem to 
contradict its aim to provide a general orientation for society. In contrast, since CSR social 
movements attempt to transform economic institutions, their economic success would be part 
of their accomplishment. The economic success of SRI has appeared to be a means for the 
social movement to transform the dominant institutional logics.  
 
The future of SRI 
Social movement theory has suffered from a lack of research on the relationship between the 
death and the success of social movements (Rao et al., 2000; Lounsbury et al., 2003; Rao et al., 
2003). This article offers interesting insights into how a social movement endeavors to maintain 
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momentum despite its success. It demonstrates that a social movement can be torn between 
two goals: 1) to change the dominant institutional logics; 2) to build alternative institutional 
logics. Additionally, this study illustrates how the consolidation of a social movement around 
common institutional logics can spawn the creation of a new field. This dilemma is well 
recognized in CSR literature and is referred to as the ‘niche vs. mainstream’ debate (Louche, 
2004; Vogel, 2005; Azoulay and Zeller, 2006; Crifo and Ponssard, 2009). The use of social 
movement theory enables us to explain why this debate occurs. It is linked to the intrinsic 
nature of social movements: their success threatens their survival. Here, the official recognition 
of the differences between challengers and incumbents via an ‘SRI label’ could permit the 
maintenance of the movement through an official agreement on SRI institutional logics. 
However, this stabilization could remodel the social movement in a stable field. Then, a 
question emerges: will this transformation into a steady organizational field mean that the 
movement strays from its primary raison d’être of changing dominant institutional logics?  
Since the movement has begun to have some success among the mainstream, the social 
movement has faced new difficulties. SRI challengers have hesitated between disappearing and 
keeping the movement alive and complaints about the motivations of certain SRI actors have 
emerged. Today, the movement appears to be at a crossroads: while some actors want to 
stabilize the existing SRI logics around an SRI label, others would prefer to diffuse the SRI logics 
into the mainstream. Lastly, other challengers wish to begin a new ‘Committed SRI’ movement, 
more demanding than the previous one. By continuously increasing the demands for change, the 
social movement could survive. These different trends seem to demonstrate that the 
movement is currently losing its collective identity. Thus, if a new social movement or a new 
organizational field emerges, the latter is likely to be different from the original one (i.e. 
different challengers with a different collective identity and a different purpose). These findings 
argue in favour of the hypothesis according to which the success of a social movement – 
regarding the transformation of the dominant institutional logics – leads to its death.  
Four future scenarios can now be envisaged. Firstly, a new SRI organizational field could be 
created by agreeing on common institutional logics, notably thanks to an ‘SRI label’. According 
to the purpose of the field members, this field could attempt to keep transforming the 
dominant institutional logics of the French asset management field. In such conditions, it can be 
imagined that the field could keep behaving as a social movement. This would prove that an 
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organizational field can play the same role as a social movement. Secondly, field members could 
aim to no longer transform the dominant institutions logics of the French asset management 
field. SRI would be transformed into a new financial product and the movement would end. 
Thirdly, SRI logics could enter the mainstream. The institutional logics of the field would be 
transformed, which, in turn, would lead to the death of the social movement. Lastly, 
‘Committed SRI’ challengers could launch a new social movement, more demanding than the 
previous one. After a while, it can be expected that this new social movement will face the 
same problem as the previous one and this, until its transformation into a steady organizational 
field or its death. However, further research is needed on the future of the French SRI 
Movement and other new social movements to argue in favour or against these different 
hypotheses. 
Whatever the future of the movement, the mainstreaming of SRI and its associated shift 
from SRI to finance raises important questions about what the goal of SRI should be. Indeed, 
the French movement has clearly framed SRI on financial logics in order to succeed, and this, at 
the expense of SRI logics. At a time when SRI aims at beginning mainstream in other countries, 
such as Scandinavia (Bengtsson, 2008), this French experience may teach other SRI movements 
about the side-effects and dangers of mainstreaming. In doing so, the study could help 
practitioners to understand the pros and cons of SRI labels, by offering a theoretical 
understanding of the role of such labels to differentiate SRI from mainstream in terms of 
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APPENDIX 1 – LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
 






 Asset Management Companies 
  
1 Asset Management 
Company A  
Head of SRI 10/13/0
6 
1h00 No 
2 Asset Management 
Company B  
Head of SRI  13/11/0
7 
1h13 Yes 
3 Asset Management 
Company C  
Head of SRI 01/08/0
7 
1h15 Yes 










6 Asset Management 
Company D 




 CIES Certification Committee (SRI Trade Unions’ label) 
  
7 CIES Trade Union B  Member  16/07/0
7 
2h06 Yes 










 Social Rating Agencies 
  
10 Social Rating Agency A  Head of Research 12/12/0
7 
1h22 Yes 
11 Social Rating Agency B  Head of Research 02/08/0
7 
0h45 Yes 
12 Social Rating Agency C  Head of Research 09/08/0
7 
1h05 Yes 












15 Think Tank A specialized 







 Asset Management Companies 
  
1 Asset Management 
Company E  
















 Financial institutions which have adopted an SRI approach for a part of 
their investments 
  
4 Bank A  Head of Corporate CSR   09/08/0
7 
1h02 Yes 
5 Insurance Company A  Head of Corporate CSR   26/10/0
7 
2h00 Yes 
6 Insurance Company B CSR Group / Project 




7 Bank B  CSR Project Manager 28/02/0
8 
1h27 Yes 
8 Insurance Company A  CSR Project Manager 11/03/0
8 
1h52 Yes 
9 Insurance Company B  CSR France / Project 




      
 Brokers with SRI Departments 
  
10 Broker A  Head of SRI Research 21/11/0
7 
1h13 Yes 








12 Consulting Firm A  Senior Consultant  09/07/0
7 
1h30 No 
13 Consulting Firm B Consultant 25/02/0
8 
1h00 No 




 French Asset Management Professional Association 
  
15 French Association of 
Management 
Chief Executive Officer 23/07/0
7 
1h35 Yes 
16 French Association of 
Management 












 Pension Fund 
  














            Figure 2: Number of Asset Management Companies Providing SRI Funds  































Figure 4: Number of Articles Mentioning SRI in French Newspapers  
 
 



































                                                
1 Source: Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) www.unpri.org 
2 French Securities Regulator 
3 Pension Reserve Fund 
4 Trade Unions Committee for Employee Saving Funds 
5 Study Center for Corporate Social Responsibility 
6 French Social Investment Forum 
7 French Society of Financial Analysts 
8  Source : Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) www.cdproject.net  
9 French Public Service Additional Pension Scheme 
10 Source : ERAFP : www.rafp.fr  
11 'General association of institutions specializing in private pension schemes for executives and employees. 
12 Total is said to be one of the more polluting companies in France.  
13 French Association of Asset Management 
14 Anisette is anise-flavored French liquor which is diluted with water before drinking, generally one volume of 
liquor to six volumes of water.  
15  Source: Principles for Responsible Investment (PRI) www.unpri.org  
16 This action follows the French ‘Grenelle de l’Environnement’ (2008-2009), which established six working  
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